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Abstract
In this article, we estimate the price elasticities of demand for subscription and consumer
switching costs for mobile telephony. We use a panel of Portuguese consumer level data to
estimate a series of multinomial and mixed logit models. The demand for subscription is
elastic. Switching costs are large. We use the structural model to perform several policy
exercises. Switching costs and brand preferences are shown to be important elements of the
market structure of mobile telephony. Price mediated network effects seem to be relatively
less important.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we estimate the price elasticities of demand for subscription and consumer
switching costs for mobile telephony. Our data set consists of a rich panel, based on monthly
invoices, of a representative group of 800 Portuguese consumers of mobile telephony services,
between April 2003 and March 2004. We estimate several multinomial logit and mixed logit
models.
Heckman (1981) distinguishes between true state dependency and spurious state dependency.
True state dependence is a consequence of all observable factors, which include switching costs.
Spurious state-dependence results from persistent heterogeneity in the preferences for brands.
Consumers may continue buying the same product because it fits better their individual tastes.
Hence, the parameters that represent switching costs may be biased if spurious state dependence
is ignored. We account for spurious state dependence by estimating mixed logit models for panel
data.1
The Portuguese mobile telephony industry, discussed in the next Section, consists of three
firms: Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus, with revenue market shares in 2005 of 50%, 37%, and 13%,
respectively.
The demand for subscription is elastic with respect to price. The price elasticities vary
substantially across firms and their consumers. The own-price elasticity of Tmn has a mean
of −1.65, and a standard deviation of 2.89. The own-price elasticity of Vodafone has a mean
of −2.10, and a standard deviation of 2.64. Finally, the own-price elasticity of Optimus has a
mean of −2.33, and a standard deviation of 2.57.
We use the structural model to perform several policy exercises that illustrate the importance
of switching costs for the market structure of mobile telephony, and evaluate their impact on the
consumer welfare. If switching costs were reduced to zero, the annual consumer surplus would
1There is a large body of empirical studies which try to separate true and spurious state dependence. Among
studies specifically on switching costs, Chen and Forman (2003) suggest two strategies to separate switching costs
from spurious state dependence. They employ an instrumental variable approach and mixed logit estimation, and
find high switching costs in the market for routers and switches. Goldfarb (2003) measures loyalty for Internet
portals controlling for household-specific heterogeneity by estimating a separate regression for each household.
Shum (2004) and Grzybowski (2007) accommodate unobserved heterogeneity via random effects.
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increase by 44.7%. Switching costs and brand preferences are shown to be important elements of
the market structure of mobile telephony. Price mediated network effects seem to be relatively
less important.
There is a large body of literature on the estimation of the demand for telecommunications
services using detailed information on usage patterns for fixed and mobile telephony. These
studies estimate mainly price elasticities of demand for connection and network originated calls:
local, long distance, international and fixed-to-mobile, mobile-to-mobile, etc.2 Few studies es-
timate switching costs in the telecommunications industry. This shortage is due to the lack of
data on the purchase history of individuals. For instance, Knittel (1997) analyzes the changes
in prices for long distance telephone calls in the U.S. after the divestiture of AT&T in 1984, and
explains price rigidity through search and switching costs. Epling (2002) studies competition
in the long distance telephony market in the U.S. after 1996. She finds evidence of the hetero-
geneity in subscriber switching costs, and that consumers with high switching costs pay higher
prices. Viard (2005) studies the impact of the introduction of number portability on prices for
toll-free numbers in the U.S. He finds that when firms cannot discriminate between old locked-in
consumers and new ones, switching costs may have an ambiguous effect on prices. Grzybowski
(2007) uses a mixed logit model to estimate firm-specific switching costs in mobile telephony
in the UK. He finds that both switching costs and persistent tastes lead to state-dependent
choices. Finally, Kim (2006) uses aggregate data on Korean mobile telephony to estimate a
dynamic structural model of switching decisions between tariff plans and firms. She finds that
the magnitude of switching costs varies across networks and that a change in the variety of
2For instance, Bloch et al. (1993) use data on a sample of Australian households to estimate price elasticities
of demand for calls on fixed networks. Mitchell et al. (1983); Train (1993); Martins-Filho and Mayo (1993) and
Bidwell et al. (1995) estimate demand for calls using data on the U.S. market. Ben-Akiva et al. (1987) analyze
choices of local telephone service plans using nested logit model. Kridel et al. (2001) analyze how customers select
carriers for long distance for the intraLATA market using detailed call information from invoices of residential
consumers. Rodini et al. (2002) estimate substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications
access, using data of U.S. households. Heitfield and Levy (2001) use billing information and demographic data to
analyze joint distribution of the number and the duration of calls. They estimate a hazard model for the duration
of calls and find that the demand for duration is inelastic with respect to price. See also the report of the New
Zealand Commerce Commission (2003) for a summary of related studies.
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optional plans and plan characteristics plays a role in the consumer switching decision.3
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents briefly the Portuguese
mobile telecommunications industry. Section 3 presents the econometric framework. Section 4
presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Overview of the Industry
In Portugal, the firm associated with the telecommunications incumbent, Tmn, started its
activity in 1989, with the analogue technology C-450. In 1991, the sectorial regulator, ICP-
ANACOM, assigned two licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 900. One of the licenses
was assigned to Tmn. The other license was assigned to the entrant Vodafone. Tmn introduced
pre-paid cards in 1995 for the first time worldwide. In 1997, the sectorial regulator assigned
three licenses to operate the digital technology GSM 1800. Two licenses were assigned to Tmn
and Vodafone. A third license was assigned to the entrant Optimus, which was also granted a
license to operate GSM 900.
At the end of the nineties, the legislation of the EU imposed the full liberalization of the
telecommunications industry. The liberalization affected essentially fixed line services. After
1998, any firm licensed by the sectorial regulator could offer fixed telephony services, either
through direct access based on their own infrastructures, or through indirect access, available
for all types of calls. In Portugal the liberalization took effect in 2000.
In 2001, ICP-ANACOM assigned four licences to operate the 3G technology IMT2000/UMTS.
Three licenses were assigned to Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus. A fourth license was assigned
to the entrant Oniway, which was not granted a license to operate GSM, and never operated.
Service began in 2001.
After its inception in 1989, the Portuguese mobile telephony industry had a fast diffusion,
3A few other studies use individual level data to estimate switching costs in different industries. Chen and
Hitt (2002) estimate the magnitude of switching costs and brand loyalty in the online brokerage industry. Chen
and Forman (2003) find high switching costs in the market for routers and switches. Dube et al. (2006) calibrate
a model of dynamic price competition with heterogeneous consumers and imperfect lock-in using data on fre-
quently purchased packaged goods. Goldfarb (2003) measures loyalty for Internet portals. Shum (2004) estimates
switching costs in the breakfast cereal industry.
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analyzed in Pereira and Pern´ıas (2006) and Pereira and Ribeiro (2006). In 2005 the penetration
rate of mobile telephony in Portugal was 110%. After entering the market in 1992, Vodafone
gained revenue market share rapidly. During the duopoly period, i.e., from 1992 to 1997, Tmn
and Vodafone essentially shared the market. The entry of Optimus led to an asymmetric split
of the market.
3 Econometric Model
In this section, we present the econometric model.
3.1 Utility of Mobile Telephony Subscription
We index consumers with subscript i = 1, ..., N , index firms with subscript j = 1, ..., J ,
and index time with subscript t = 1, ..., T . Each firm offers one product. Denote by pijt, the
cost for individual i of consuming alternative j in period t, denote by rj , a dummy variable for
firm j, and denote by zit, a vector of characteristics of consumer i in period t. The consumer
characteristics are: (i) the age below 30 years, (ii) the age between 30 and 50 years, (iii) the
gender, (iv) the residence in the Lisbon region, and (iv) the social class. Denote by sijt, a
dummy variable that takes value 0 if consumer i chooses in period t the same alternative j he
chose in period t − 1, and takes value 1 otherwise. This variable accounts for switching costs,
and its coefficient is interpreted as the disutility of changing of provider.
Before subscribing to a firm, consumers form expectations about the number of calls and
messages.4 We assume that a consumer’s expected calling pattern is independent of the firm to
which he subscribes. This assumption is justifiable because the demand for usage is inelastic.5
4Actually, consumers make three interrelated decisions. First, they choose a firm. Second, they choose the
number of calls and the number of messages. Third, they choose the duration of the calls. Because of missing
information on tariffs, we cannot link the demands for calls and messages and the demand for network operator.
However, even in the presence of information on tariffs, the modeling of demand would be very complicated due
to different services available and prices varying by time and destination of calls.
5Grzybowski and Pereira (2007a) estimated a price elasticity of demand for mobile telephone calls of −0.38,
and Grzybowski and Pereira (2007b) estimated a price elasticity of demand for the duration of mobile telephone
calls of −0.2.
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Besides, the price differences across firms are relatively small.
After forming expectations about the cost of using mobile services, a consumer chooses the
firm to which he subscribes. Consumer i derives utility from alternative j in period t given by:
Uijt(pijt, rj , zit, sit, ξij ; θ) = Vijt(pijt, rj , zit, sijt, ξij ; θ) + ²ijt,
where ξij is an unobservable individual heterogeneity component, and ²ijt is a stochastic error
term, and θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.6 We assume additionally that:
Vijt(pijt, rj , zit, sit, ξij ; θ) := rj − αpijt + βjzit + γsit + ξij ,
where α is the price coefficient, i.e., the negative of the marginal utility of income, β is the vector
of the coefficients of the consumer characteristics, γ is the coefficient of the dummy variable sijt.
Variable ²ijt is identically and independently distributed across individuals, alternatives,
and periods, and follows a Type I extreme value distribution, with a scale parameter σ². Let
ξ := (ξi1, ξi2).7 Variable ξ is identically and independently distributed across individuals, and
follows a joint-normal distribution with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ, whose density
function is denoted by f(·). In addition, the error term, ²ijt, and the unobservable individual
heterogeneity component, ξij , are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, (pijt, rj , zit, sijt).
3.2 Choice Probabilities
The assumptions on ²ijt imply that conditional on the individual specific variable, ξ, the
choice probability of each firm is given by the logit formula. Thus, the conditional probability
of consumer i selecting alternative j in period t is:
Pijt(ξ) := Pr [j|pijt, ·, ξ] = exp(Vijt(ξij))∑
j∈J exp(Vikt(ξik))
.
The unconditional choice probability is given by:
P˜ijt :=
∫
ξ
Pijt(ξ)f(ξ)dξ. (1)
6The other potential choice determinants, such as the coverage and reception quality, are assumed to be
constant throughout the time of this study.
7We normalize the utility of one alternative to zero.
6
This specification can be generalized to the case of repeated choices. Assuming that the coef-
ficients are constant over choices, but vary across consumers, the unconditional probability (1)
for a sequence of choices is given by:8
P˜ijt :=
∫
ξ
∏
t
Pijt(ξ)f(ξ)dξ. (2)
3.3 Demand Elasticities
Denote by εijkt, the elasticity of demand of product j with respect to the price of product
k for consumer i in period t:
εijkt :=
∂Pijt
∂pikt
pikt
Pijt
.
In the multinomial logit model, the partial derivative is given by
∂Pijt
∂pikt
=
 −αPijt(1− Pijt) if k=jαPijtPikt otherwise,
which implies the following elasticities:
εijkt =
 −αpijt(1− Pijt) if k=jαpiktPikt otherwise.
In the mixed logit model, the partial derivatives of the choice probabilities are given by:
∂P˜ijt
∂pikt
=
 −α
∫
ξ Pijt(ξ)(1− Pijt(ξ))f(ξ)dξ if k=j
α
∫
ξ Pijt(ξ)Pikt(ξ)f(ξ)dξ otherwise,
where Pijt(ξ) =
exp(Vijt(ξij))∑
j∈J exp(Vikt(ξik))
, and the elasticities are obtained analogously.
3.4 Consumer Surplus
Denote by V 0ijt(ξ) and V
1
ijt(ξ), the utility levels before and after a price increase, respec-
tively. The change in consumer welfare caused by a price increase can be represented by the
compensating variation. It captures the money amount by which consumers would need to be
8Since many consumers did not provide information about bills for the whole period, our panel is unbalanced.
7
compensated to maintain the same level of utility after a price change (Small and Rosen (1981)).
This formula for consumer i is given by:
CVi =
1
α
∑
t
∫
ξ
[
ln
(∑
j∈J
exp(V 1ijt(ξij))
)
− ln
(∑
j∈J
exp(V 0ijt(ξij))
)]
f(ξ)dξ. (3)
3.5 Estimation Strategy
The utility of Vodafone is normalized to zero. Thus, all estimates are interpreted relative to
those of Vodafone.
In our data set the churn rate is 4% a year. Since few consumers switch of provider, we
assume that switching costs are the same across firms.9
The identification of the state dependency is based on the comparison of the choices of
consumers who subscribed to a given firm in the previous period, with the choices of the con-
sumers who subscribed to the other firms. As discussed in section 4.1, in our data set 62%
of consumers subscribe to the cheapest firm for their observed usage pattern. The remaining
consumers use more expensive providers due to either: switching costs, uncertainty about the
cost of the alternatives, or persistent brand preferences.
We approximate the probabilities in (2) through simulation. First, we draw a vector of values
ξr from distribution N(µ,Σ), and label it with subscript r = 1. Second, given the value of ξr,
we calculate the logit formula inside the integral in (2). We repeat these two steps R times and
calculate the simulated choice probability through the average:
P˜ijt :=
1
R
R∑
r=1
[∏
t
exp(Vijt(ξrij))∑
j∈J exp(Vikt(ξ
r
ik))
]
.
The mixed logit simulated log-likelihood function for a given sequence of choices is given by:
L(·) =
∑
i
log(P˜ijt).
The maximum simulated likelihood estimator is the value of the distribution parameters, (µ,Σ),
and the coefficients of the utility function, θ, that maximizes L.
9It is possible to estimate firm specific switching costs for a multinomial logit model. These estimates, however,
do not vary significantly across firms, and a likelihood ratio test cannot reject the null hypothesis of their equality.
For a mixed logit model, firm specific switching costs lead to problems in the identification of the random effects.
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To implement the random-effects approach, we assume that: (i) the initial choices are ex-
ogenous, and (ii) the joint distribution of the unobserved effects does not depend on the initial
choices. These assumptions ensure that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity param-
eters is invariant to the initial choices. Assuming that the initial conditions are exogenous bias
upwards the estimated state dependence, and bias downwards the estimated heterogeneity.10
4 Econometric Implementation
In this section, we: (i) describe the data, (ii) present the estimation results, (iii) present
the price elasticities of demand, and (iv) perform some policy exercises.
4.1 Data
Our data set consists of a micro panel, based on monthly invoices. The information was
collected by Marktest for mainland Portugal, between April 2003 and March 2004. The panel
of 800 households is proportional, segmented by age, 5 social classes and 6 regions.11 Table 1
shows the information recorded for each communication made by an individual. Calls to mobile
networks, calls to fixed networks, and messages account for 95% of the traffic.
[Table 1]
10The observed choices of the first period depend on of the choices of the earlier periods, which are not observed.
Hence, it is not possible to estimate the model for this period. More importantly, it may be expected that the
outcome of the initial choices depends on unobserved heterogeneity. The short time period between the first and
the last observations in our data set, and the resulting small number of switching consumers makes it difficult
to account for endogenous initial conditions. Solutions to the problem of endogenous initial conditions for the
dynamic probit model are discussed by Heckman (1981) and Wooldridge (2002). Heckman (1981) proposes
approximating the conditional distribution of the initial condition. Wooldridge (2002) suggests to model the
distribution of the unobserved effect conditional on the initial value and any exogenous explanatory variables.
11The stratification of the sample was based on the 2001 census data from the Portuguese National Statistics
Institute. The social class levels are: 1 – High, 2 – Medium/High, 3 – Medium, 4 – Medium/Low, 5 – Low.
The regions are: 1 – Greater Lisbon, 2 – Greater OPorto, 3 – Northern Coast, 4 – Central Coast, 5 – Northern
Interior, 6 – South.
9
Table 2 presents the monthly values for our sample of the subscriber market shares.
[Table 2]
Table 3 shows the average monthly invoice values.
[Table 3]
The data set has three limitations. First, there is no information about the tariff plans
chosen by the individuals. Second, there is little variation in prices among the clients of each
firm, and over time.12 Third, the data set only samples users of mobile telephony.
[Table 4]
[Table 5]
[Table 6]
For the choice of which firm to subscribe, we need to assign to each individual: (i) the cost
of using the service to which he subscribes, and (ii) the cost of using the alternatives. Because
we have no information about the tariff plans chosen by the individuals, we have to infer the
price paid by consumers for calls and messages based on the information from the invoices.13
We compute the cost of using mobile services as follows. First, for all subscribers of a given
firm in a given month, we calculate the average per-second price of calling mobile and fixed line
numbers at certain times of the day, and of the week, i.e., weekday and weekend, and similarly
for sending messages. The values of average prices for 60-seconds calls and for messages at
different times of the day, and different days of the week in April 2003 are provided in Table
4. Then, given individual calling patterns, we calculate for each consumer the cost of using the
services of different firms. This calculation assumes that all consumers face the same average
12Most of the consumers of Optimus pay 0.211 cents per minute, without VAT, and almost all of the consumers
of Vodafone pay 0.238 cents per minute. There is more variation in the per minute prices paid by the consumers
of Tmn.
13The data set does not indicate how much individuals pay for monthly subscription fees. However, in Portugal
over 80% of the subscribers have pre-paid cards. Since our sample is composed of residential clients, the percentage
of subscribers with pre-paid cards is certainly no smaller.
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per-second prices. This is a strong assumption, but common in empirical studies. In fact, we
are more precise than usual, by calculating the variation in price over time and destination. The
differences in the value of the invoices are determined by the type, length, and timing of the
calls and messages. The correlation between the observed values and the computed values of
the invoices is 90% or higher, depending on the month and the firm, as shown in Tables 5 and
6. Moreover, 62% of consumers are subscribed to the cheapest firm for their observed usage
pattern. This suggests that our procedure is reasonable.
We do not observe individuals who choose not to use mobile services. Hence, we assume
that in the period of this study, everybody has access to mobile services. This assumption is
justifiable because the penetration rate of mobile telephony in Portugal reached 90% in the
second quarter of 2004, and 110% in the fourth quarter of 2005. 14
We model switching costs through the dependence of the subscription choices of the current
period on the subscription choices of the previous period. Thus, for the models where we assume
that consumers choose to which firm they subscribe every month, we loose the observations from
the first month. For the models where the horizon of the consumers’ subscription choices is larger
than one month, we loose a larger number of observations. In addition, if there is a gap in the
reported invoices, we loose the first observation after this gap.
In the estimation with monthly choices we use 8, 015 observations. The market shares for
the whole sample are preserved and represent 50.3%, 33.5%, and 16.2%, for Tmn, Vodafone,
and Optimus, respectively.
14The European Commission and national competition authorities, in a number of decisions on mobile commu-
nications services, used product market definition which excludes fixed communications services. The Commission
claimed that mobile communications services cannot be seen as being substitutable to fixed communications ser-
vices because of the mobility inherent in all mobile services, i.e., mobile numbers are associated with individuals
on the move, rather than a fixed location. Such market definition implies that if the prices of mobile telephony
services increased, nobody would give up mobile services.
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4.2 Basic Estimation Results
We estimated seven models by maximum likelihood.15 The results are presented in Tables
7 and 8.
[Table 7]
In Models 1, 2, 3, and 4, we assume that consumers choose every month to which firm they
subscribe. Model 1 is a multinomial logit model without switching costs. The estimates of the
price coefficient and the consumer characteristics are significant.
Model 2 is a multinomial logit model with switching costs. Compared with Model 1, Model
2 has a much larger log-likelihood. In addition, the estimate of the price coefficient decreases,
but remains significant. Consumer characteristics are non-significant in determining the choice
of Optimus and Tmn compared to Vodafone.16 The estimate of the coefficient of the switching
costs dummy variable is negative, relatively large, and highly significant. This suggests that
consumers have substantial switching costs. Because few consumers switch of provider, prices
and switching costs explain almost perfectly the choice probabilities. However, this specification
ignores the presence of unobservable persistent heterogeneity, which may bias the estimates of
switching costs.
Model 3 is a mixed logit model with switching costs, and persistent unobserved brand prefer-
ences. This specification implies a contemporaneous and an intertemporal dependence of choices.
Compared with Model 2, the overall fit improves. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hy-
pothesis that there is no persistent consumer heterogeneity. The test statistic is χ2 = 12, which
is larger than the critical value for two degrees of freedom χ2(0.01, 2) = 9.21. In addition, the
estimates of the coefficients of prices and the dummy variable for switching costs increase. The
estimates of the coefficients of the firm dummy variables are insignificant for both Optimus and
Tmn, but have significant standard deviations. The estimates of the coefficients of the consumer
characteristics are insignificant as before. Therefore, the choice probabilities are explained by:
switching costs, prices, and persistent unobserved brand preferences.
15We used the SAS procedure ”proc nlmixed” to estimate the mixed logit models.
16The coefficients on consumer characteristics are alternative specific. After the normalization (βj − β3) z is
estimated, and the coefficient is then interpreted relative to the coefficient of alternative 3.
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Model 4 is similar to Model 3, except that it excludes consumer characteristics. The esti-
mate of the coefficient of the firm dummy variable is significant and negative for Optimus, and
insignificant for Tmn. Thus, on average, consumers value equally Tmn and Vodafone, and value
Tmn and Vodafone relatively more than Optimus. However, given the standard deviations,
there are consumers with both higher and lower valuations for Optimus relative to Vodafone,
and similarly for Tmn.
Table 8 presents the estimates of mixed logit model assuming different choice horizons.
[Table 8]
Models 5, 6, and 7 are similar to Model 4, except that the horizon of the subscription choices
is two, three, and four months, respectively. The estimates of the coefficient of the dummy
variable for switching costs decrease slightly, and the estimates of the price coefficient increase.
Thus, if the horizon of the subscription choices increases from one to four months, the demand
becomes more elastic with respect to price.
Given the previous discussion, we select Model 4 to conduct our analysis.
4.3 Price Elasticities of Demand
Table 9 presents the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for the whole sample of
individuals.
[Table 9]
The own- and cross-price elasticities are large and vary substantially across firms and their
consumers. The own-price elasticity of the demand of Tmn has a mean of −1.65, a median
of −0.05, and a standard deviation of 2.89. If the price of Tmn increases 1%, on average, the
number of subscribers of Tmn decreases 1.65%. The cross-price elasticities of the demand of
Tmn with respect to the prices of Vodafone and Optimus are 1.29 and 1.24, respectively. If the
price of Vodafone increases 1%, on average, the number of subscribers of Tmn increases 1.29%.
The own-price elasticity of the demand of Vodafone has a mean of −2.10, a median of −1.30,
and a standard deviation of 2.64. The cross-price elasticities of the demand of Vodafone with
respect to the prices of Tmn and Optimus are both 0.97. Finally, the own-price elasticity of the
13
demand of Optimus has an average of −2.33, a median of −1.70, and a standard deviation of
2.57. The cross-price elasticities of the demand of Optimus with respect to the prices of Tmn
and Vodafone are 0.43 and 0.49, respectively.17
Table 10 presents the average marginal effects.
[Table 10]
The marginal effects of changes in prices on the probability of choices are very small, which
is due to switching costs being high. Thus, a price increase by one of the firms does not lead
to a substantial reallocation of consumers. For instance, if the price of Tmn increases by 100%,
on average, the probability of a consumer subscribing to Tmn decreases 0.048. If the price
of Vodafone increases 100%, on average, the probability of a consumer subscribing to Tmn
increases 0.016.
4.4 Some Policy Exercises
Next we perform six policy exercises to illustrate the importance of switching costs for the
market structure of mobile telephony, and to evaluate their impact on the consumer welfare.
Some of the exercises consist of simulations using the structural model of demand, reported in
Table 11. Since the market shares do not change substantially over time, we compute only the
average annual market shares.
First, we calculate the impact on the consumer surplus of a price increase, given by (3). If the
prices of all firms increase 10%, the annual consumer surplus decreases by 8.76%. If, however,
the switching costs are reduced to zero, the annual consumer surplus increases by 44.7%.18
[Table 11]
Second, we compute the market shares assuming that the switching costs are equal to 0 for
all firms. The market share of Optimus increases 10 percentage points, mostly at the expense
of Tmn, whose market share decreases 8 points. However, Tmn still remains with the largest
17Grzybowski and Pereira (2006) in the estimation based on industry level data for Portugal between 1999 and
2005 also find that demand for subscriptions is very elastic.
18As for the price elasticities, the calculation was conducted for 1, 000 random draws.
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market share. This may be due to brand preferences, or to Tmn being the cheapest alternative
for many consumers, given their usage pattern.
Third, we compute the market shares assuming that for Tmn the prices of on-net and off-net
calls are the same and equal to the average price of mobile calls. As shown in Table 4, there
are substantial differences between the prices of on-net and off-net calls. This may provide Tmn
with a competitive advantage by creating price-mediated network effects. Because most calls
are on-net, the average price of mobile calls for Tmn of is close to the price of on-net calls. This
implies that Tmn is the cheapest firm for many consumers. Consequently, the market shares
do not change at all. However, if one assumes in addition that there are no switching costs, the
market share of Tmn decreases by 2 points more than in the former case.
Fourth, we compute the market shares assuming that switching costs are equal 0 for only
one of the firms. It is costless to switch to a given firm, but it remains costly to switch to the
other firms.19 The case where the cost of switching to Tmn is 0 involves the largest reallocation
of consumers. The market share of Tmn increases 22 points, mostly at the expense of Vodafone,
whose market share decreases 14 points.
Fifth, we compute the market shares assuming that for all consumers, Tmn and Vodafone
have the same cost of mobile services, and set the switching costs to 0 for all firms. The market
shares of Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus are, respectively, 0.37, 0.34, and 0.29. Since consumers
value Tmn and Vodafone equally, this shows that persistence of brand preferences plays an
important role in mobile telephony.
Sixth, we compute the market shares assuming that one of firms sets its price to 0, and
the switching costs remain at the estimated level. Interestingly, the changes in market shares
are smaller than when the cost of switching to the same firms is 0. For instance, if the cost of
switching to Optimus is 0, while the cost of switching to the other firms remains at the estimated
level, the market shares of Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus are, respectively, 34%, 21% and 45%.
If the price of Optimus is 0 while the prices of the other firms and the cost of switching remain
at the estimated level, the market shares of Tmn, Vodafone, and Optimus are, respectively, 46%,
29% and 25%.
19The firm in question may pay consumers the equivalent of their switching costs.
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These simulations illustrate three important points. First, switching costs are an important
element of the market structure of mobile telephony. Even if firms were to set prices to zero,
in the short run, only a relatively small share of consumers would switch of provider. Second,
persistent brand preferences are also an important element of the market structure of mobile
telephony. Even if the switching costs of all firms where zero, the relative ranking of the firms
in terms of market share would remain unchanged. Third, price mediated network effects are
less important than switching costs and brand preference in the market structure of mobile
telephony.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we estimated the price elasticities of demand for subscription and consumer
switching costs for mobile telephony. We used data from a panel of about 800 consumers of mo-
bile services in Portugal between April 2003 and March 2004, and estimated several multinomial
and mixed logit models.
Our findings show that the demand for subscription is elastic with respect to price, and that
the price elasticities vary substantially across firms and their consumers. Switching costs are
very high.
We also performed several policy exercises to illustrate the importance of switching costs for
the market structure of mobile telephony, and to evaluate the impact on welfare on the consumer
switching costs.
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Tables
Table 1: Information Recorded about Calls
Originating network Optimus, Tmn, Vodafone
Type of call international, services, n800, messages
Optimus, Tmn, Vodafone, fixed line, others, data
Value cents without VAT
Date year/month/day
Time hour/minute/second
Table 2: Subscriber Market Shares
month No. Optimus Tmn Vodafone
04.2003 862 0.21 0.49 0.30
05.2003 896 0.21 0.49 0.30
06.2003 895 0.21 0.49 0.30
07.2003 889 0.22 0.47 0.30
08.2003 920 0.21 0.48 0.31
09.2003 940 0.21 0.48 0.31
10.2003 943 0.20 0.48 0.31
11.2003 826 0.12 0.51 0.36
12.2003 858 0.15 0.51 0.33
01.2004 822 0.13 0.51 0.37
02.2004 833 0.14 0.51 0.35
03.2004 904 0.16 0.50 0.34
20
Table 3: Monthly Average Expenditure in Euros
Optimus Tmn Vodafone
month No. Bill No. Bill No. Bill
04.2003 181 13.82 422 13.66 259 16.21
05.2003 191 14.97 442 14.02 263 17.83
06.2003 189 15.12 439 12.96 267 19.45
07.2003 199 15.93 421 15.51 269 22.35
08.2003 192 16.73 444 13.65 284 21.07
09.2003 201 15.94 450 14.11 289 21.49
10.2003 190 12.87 457 13.12 296 19.43
11.2003 103 17.86 423 12.89 300 21.21
12.2003 132 14.24 437 15.03 289 22.89
01.2004 104 16.76 420 12.91 298 19.25
02.2004 113 15.06 428 12.78 292 17.56
03.2004 143 14.84 454 13.71 307 17.67
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Table 4: Average Prices of 1-minute Calls and Messages in April 2003 (Euros)
Weekday Optimus Tmn Vodafone
0-7 SMS 0.097 0.064 0.047
fixed 0.210 0.204 0.240
mobile off-net 0.213 0.407 0.222
mobile on-net 0.190 0.150 0.218
7-17 SMS 0.097 0.067 0.053
fixed 0.218 0.233 0.251
mobile off-net 0.228 0.313 0.255
mobile on-net 0.190 0.149 0.211
17-0 SMS 0.098 0.069 0.056
fixed 0.214 0.243 0.233
mobile off-net 0.226 0.303 0.245
mobile on-net 0.190 0.151 0.215
Weekend
0-7 SMS 0.098 0.063 0.058
fixed 0.210 0.258 0.246
mobile off-net 0.210 0.240 0.234
mobile on-net 0.199 0.151 0.238
7-17 SMS 0.098 0.070 0.055
fixed 0.206 0.217 0.218
mobile off-net 0.205 0.273 0.221
mobile on-net 0.197 0.145 0.220
17-0 SMS 0.098 0.072 0.057
fixed 0.205 0.203 0.204
mobile off-net 0.209 0.269 0.224
mobile on-net 0.189 0.147 0.224
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Table 5: Average Computed Cost of Alternatives in April 2003 in Euros
Optimus Mean Std Min Max
observed 13.66 14.24 0.20 84.00
Optimus 13.57 14.18 0.19 82.33
Tmn 16.80 18.08 0.13 96.29
Vodafone 14.44 14.80 0.10 80.14
Tmn
observed 13.81 12.91 0.16 97.42
Optimus 18.89 19.14 0.41 127.02
Tmn 15.06 14.63 0.30 110.58
Vodafone 19.54 20.45 0.43 135.99
Vodafone
observed 16.61 23.55 0.23 237.48
Optimus 18.12 25.36 0.22 223.51
Tmn 20.66 30.66 0.21 277.84
Vodafone 17.38 24.45 0.21 220.95
Table 6: Average Computed Cost of Alternatives in April 2003: Correlation Matrix
Optimus observed Optimus Tmn Vodafone
observed 1.00
Optimus 0.97 1.00
Tmn 0.92 0.93 1.00
Vodafone 0.92 0.94 0.98 1.00
Tmn
observed 1.00
Optimus 0.83 1.00
TMN 0.88 0.97 1.00
Vodafone 0.82 0.99 0.97 1.00
Vodafone
observed 1.00
Optimus 0.89 1.00
Tmn 0.90 0.98 1.00
Vodafone 0.92 0.99 0.99 1.00
23
Table 7: Multinominal Logit and Mixed Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
price -0.478 -42.46 -0.1970 -6.70 -0.2591 -4.31 -0.2161 -5.80
s -6.2864 -27.65 -8.4788 -8.46 -7.9939 -10.10
Opt dummy -0.965 -6.43 -0.7861 -0.64 -1.0687 -0.05 -0.8376 -2.65
Opt std 1.8145 3.51 1.7396 4.50
age< 30 0.788 7.45 1.0639 1.42 1.1340 0.36
age< 50 -0.089 -0.99 0.2840 0.43 0.2448 0.12
Lisbon -0.114 -1.21 0.7666 1.07 0.8113 0.14
male 0.443 5.79 0.2184 0.40 0.2036 0.08
class A -1.888 -8.96 -2.8034 -2.01 -3.2645 -0.17
class B -0.823 -5.39 -0.4520 -0.36 -0.0852 -0.00
class C1 -0.857 -5.81 -1.1646 -0.96 -1.3808 -0.07
class C2 0.003 0.02 0.5360 0.42 1.1746 0.06
Tmn dummy -0.096 -0.67 -0.0674 -0.05 -0.3245 -0.01 0.1236 0.41
Tmn std 1.7641 4.02 1.5859 4.00
age< 30 0.364 4.26 0.0651 0.09 0.1642 0.09
age< 50 0.042 0.58 -0.1116 -0.17 -0.0368 -0.01
Lisbon -0.345 -4.66 -0.0626 -0.09 0.1451 0.13
male 0.300 4.92 0.3058 0.55 0.3338 0.14
class A 0.018 0.11 0.0566 0.04 -0.5016 -0.02
class B 0.178 1.23 0.3668 0.28 0.5860 0.02
class C1 0.167 1.18 -0.1569 -0.12 -0.4422 -0.02
class C2 0.381 2.58 0.8322 0.61 1.3606 0.05
LL -5756 -177 -171 -179
Obs 8015 8015 8015 8015
Cragg-Uhler1 0.532 0.8839 0.8840 0.8838
Cragg-Uhler2 0.599 0.9944 0.9946 0.9943
Adj.Estrella 0.604 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998
McFadden LRI 0.346 0.9799 0.9806 0.9796
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Table 8: Mixed Logit for Different Choice Intervals
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
price -0.2161 -5.80 -0.2079 -6.65 -0.2225 -7.90 -0.2456 -7.42
s -7.9939 -10.10 -7.4926 -9.24 -7.1585 -9.72 -7.1273 -8.35
Opt dummy -0.8376 -2.65 -0.7077 -2.57 -0.8857 -3.23 -1.0676 -3.44
Opt std 1.7396 4.50 1.7421 4.16 1.7227 4.74 1.6645 3.59
Tmn dummy 0.1236 0.41 0.4152 1.55 0.3928 1.55 0.6106 2.17
Tmn std 1.5859 4.00 1.6729 -4.07 1.6450 -3.80 1.5791 3.13
LL -179 -240 -253 -210
Obs 8015 6867 5919 5037
Cragg-Uhler1 0.8838 0.8808 0.8790 0.8792
Cragg-Uhler2 0.9943 0.9909 0.9888 0.9891
Adj.Estrella 0.9998 0.9995 0.9992 0.9992
McFadden LRI 0.9796 0.9898 0.9611 0.9878
Table 9: Demand Elasticities: Choices of Network Operators
Optimus Tmn Vodafone
Optimus -2.33 0.43 0.49
median -1.70 0.002 0.01
variance 2.57 1.32 1.44
Tmn 1.24 -1.65 1.29
median 0.12 -0.05 0.23
variance 1.99 2.89 2.07
Vodafone 0.97 0.97 -2.10
median 0.01 0.006 -1.30
variance 2.26 2.30 2.64
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Table 10: Marginal Effects: Choices of Network Operators
Optimus Tmn Vodafone
Optimus -0.00051 0.00032 0.00019
median -0.00022 0.00018 0.00000
variance 0.0011 0.00056 0.00081
Tmn 0.00032 -0.00048 0.00016
median 0.00018 -0.00031 0.00014
variance 0.00056 0.0006 0.00020
Vodafone 0.00019 0.00016 -0.00035
median 0.00000 0.00014 -0.00025
variance 0.00081 0.00020 0.00085
Table 11: Market Shares Simulations
Optimus Tmn Vodafone
observed 0.16 0.50 0.34
s=0 for all 0.26 0.42 0.32
s=0 for all, on-net=off-net for Tmn 0.27 0.40 0.33
s=0 for Optimus 0.45 0.34 0.21
s=0 for Tmn 0.08 0.72 0.20
s=0 for Vodafone 0.07 0.32 0.61
s=0 for all, equal prices for Tmn and Vodafone 0.29 0.37 0.34
price=0 for Optimus 0.25 0.46 0.29
price=0 for Tmn 0.14 0.58 0.28
price=0 for Vodafone 0.14 0.45 0.41
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